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Abstract Abstract Abstract Abstract       
 
In  this  paper  we  argue  that  corporate  social  responsibility  (CSR)  to  various  stakeholders 
(customers, shareholders, employees, suppliers, and community) has a positive effect on global 
brand equity (BE). In addition, policies aimed at satisfying community interests help reinforce 
credibility  to  social  responsible  polices  with  other  stakeholders.  We  test  these  theoretical 
contentions using panel data comprised of 57 global brands originating from 10 countries (USA, 
Japan, South Korea, France, UK, Italy, Germany, Finland, Switzerland and the Netherlands) for 
the period 2002 to 2008. Our findings show that CSR to each of the stakeholder groups has a 
positive impact on global BE. In addition, global brands that follow local social responsibility 
policies over communities obtain strong positive benefits in terms of the generation of BE, as it 
enhances the positive effects of CSR to other stakeholders, particularly to customers. Therefore, 
for managers of global brands it is particularly productive for generating brand value to combine 
global strategies with the satisfaction of the interests of local communities.       
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1. Introduction 1. Introduction 1. Introduction 1. Introduction       
Global brands are widespread in multiple markets, such as financial services, telecom, and fast-
moving consumer goods. Multiple firms, such as Unilever, have clearly started to focus more on 
building strong global brands instead of building multiple (strong) local brands (Kumar, 2005). 
A strong corporate social responsibility (CSR) record is considered to be a key expectation from 
these global brands (Holt, Quelch & Taylor, 2004). Implementation of a CSR policy may 
generate a trusting relationship that leads stakeholders to become committed to the organization 
through actions such as customer loyalty, stockholder capital investments, and supplier 
investments (Garbarino & Johnson, 1999; Maignan & Ferrell, 2004; Sen, Bhattacharya & 
Korschun, 2006). In the global marketplace, a firm’s social and environmental track record and 
its treatment of employees are considered as very important trust issues (Edelman, 2008). 
Yet, it is frequently stated that global brands do not have strong CSR records, and they 
are accused of predatory behavior (Connor, 2001). Besides, building up CSR reputations is 
difficult for global brands, as global brands have to build local CSR reputations through local 
relationships while they also have to display global social responsibility (Polonsky & Jevons, 
2009). Moreover, CSR practices of global brands are typically perceived as being self-interested, 
which may reduce their effects on brand equity (BE) (e.g. Prout, 2006; Yoon, Gürhan-Canli & 
Schwarz, 2006). Specific examples have shown the relevance of CSR for global brands. The large 
problems of BP with their local oil operations in the Gulf of Mexico near Louisiana had strong 
global repercussions for the global BP brand (Ritson, 2010).  Coca Cola was confronted with 
protests by customers in the UK and the USA because of what was considered their poor 
environmental record in India and allegations of human rights violations in Columbia (Hills & 
Welford, 2005). Moreover, the global presence of brands and their operations may even cause 
the CSR policies of strong highly visible global brands to backfire. For example, Nike has sought 
to associate itself with the rights, needs, and aspirations of the socially disadvantaged, such as 4 
 
African Americans, women and the disabled -i.e. through using brand endorsements such as 
Michael Jordan- (Knight & Greenberg, 2002, p. 547). However, the so-called anti-sweatshop 
movement believed that Nike is hypocritical, as Nike was blamed for exploiting young, migrant, 
female workers in the developing world to produce its products and only uses its promotional 
CSR to boost sales (Knight & Greenberg, 2002). Similar arguments appear in Wagner, Lutz and 
Weitz (2009) who point out the negative reaction of consumers towards reactive CSR strategies 
which try to mitigate harm after some irresponsible action has been reported. The Nike case also 
points to a complicating issue, namely that CSR involves activities focused on multiple 
stakeholders, including customers, employees, shareholders, and the community in which the 
credibility of CSR policies will play a pivotal role in the efficient implementation of CSR 
initiatives. Firms, therefore, need to understand whether and how their multi-faceted CSR efforts 
have an impact on their global BE. 
Within the academic literature there is a vast amount of research on the effects of CSR 
on brand performance metrics, such as brand evaluations and brand loyalty, and firm 
performance (e.g. Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006; Du, Bhattacharya & Sen, 2007a; Klein & Dawar, 
2004; Orlitzky, Schmidt & Rynes, 2003). However, studies on CSR and global brands are 
scarce. Holt et al. (2004) emphasize the importance of CSR as a way to differentiate for global 
brands, while Polonsky and Jevons (2009) discuss global branding and CSR in a qualitative 
manner. Specific in-depth case studies have described CSR issues for global brands, such as Nike 
and Coca Cola (e.g. Hills & Wellford, 2005; Knight & Greenberg, 2002). Research within 
business ethics has also discussed the relevance of CSR for global firms and research on CSR 
from a global perspective (e.g. Arthaud-Day, 2005; Manakkalathil & Rudolf, 1995; Prout, 
2006). However, we could not identify any studies that explicitly studied the relationship 
between a global brand’s CSR efforts and global BE in an international setting. 
The key research question in this study is to investigate the effects of CSR practices to 
different stakeholders on global BE, emphasizing the role played by credible CSR initiatives. We 5 
 
first investigate whether CSR efforts impact global BE. Second, we aim to assess which CSR 
efforts have the strongest effects on global BE. We hypothesize that the direct effects of CSR to 
the community and customers on global BE will be stronger, particularly when complemented 
between them, than the effects of CSR directed at other stakeholders. Thirdly, we investigate the 
potential moderating role of CSR to the community, which confers credibility to CSR initiatives, 
on the impact of CSR to different stakeholders on BE. 
We address these issues using panel data of 57 global brands originating from 10 
countries (the US, Japan, South Korea, France, the UK, Italy, Germany, Finland, Switzerland, and 
the Netherlands), as included in the 2002–2008 Sustainalytics Global Profile (SGP) database. 
Each firm’s CSR profile contains items that cover major stakeholder issues. We complement the 
database with global BE information obtained from Interbrand. Our econometric approach 
allows us to assess potential long-term effects through the inclusion of a lagged BE term in our 
model. Hence, we also discuss potential long-term effects of CSR on global BE.  
The contributions of this study are threefold. First, although prior theoretical arguments 
justify the connection between CSR and BE, we provide the first empirical study addressing this 
issue at an international level. Second, this study explicitly examines the differential effects of 
CSR efforts to different stakeholders on global BE, where we specifically focus on the important 
role of CSR efforts to the community and customers. Last, we contemplate interaction effects 
between community satisfaction and different CSR dimensions in the generation of brand value.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We will first discuss our theoretical 
underpinnings and the derived hypotheses. Then, we will describe our data and econometric 
model used. The modeling results are discussed subsequently and we end with a conclusion, 
managerial implications, a discussion of our research limitations and resulting future research 
directions.       
2. Theoretical Underpinnings and Hypotheses 2. Theoretical Underpinnings and Hypotheses 2. Theoretical Underpinnings and Hypotheses 2. Theoretical Underpinnings and Hypotheses 6 
 
2.1 C 2.1 C 2.1 C 2.1 CSR SR SR SR       and Brand Equity and Brand Equity and Brand Equity and Brand Equity       
CSR has gained attention in multiple disciplines including marketing, management, strategy, and 
business ethics. A relatively broad definition of corporate social responsibility is: “the company’s 
status and activities with respect to its perceived societal obligations” (Brown & Dacin, 1997, p. 
68). Its broad nature also implies that CSR involves multiple initiatives relevant for multiple 
stakeholders, such as community support, employee support and diversity (Sen et al., 2006).  
  For the management of brands, firms need a strong understanding of what is driving BE. 
Keller and Lehmann (2006) consider three distinct perspectives for studying BE: (1) customer-
based, (2) company-based and (3) financially-based. In this study we use the Interbrand measure 
for our measure of global BE. This measure, which is discussed in greater detail in our 
methodology section, is frequently used within marketing (e.g. Madden, Fehle & Fournier, 
2006). It has a rather broad perspective as it involves both a financial and a customer perspective, 
although it is not free from criticism (Madden et al., 2006).  
 
2.2 Effect of CSR on Brand Equity 2.2 Effect of CSR on Brand Equity 2.2 Effect of CSR on Brand Equity 2.2 Effect of CSR on Brand Equity       
Although there are multiple studies that look at outcomes of CSR, no study has yet investigated 
the effect of CSR on global BE. We expect CSR to positively affect global BE. Given that our 
BE measure involves both a customer dimension and a financial dimension, we use two lines of 
reasoning as to why this effect may occur. First, CSR may affect customer brand preferences and 
customer loyalty (e.g. Bhattacharya & Sen, 2004; Du et al., 2007a; Orlitzky et al., 2003). Second, 
CSR may affect the financial performance of a brand (Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006).  
Within the popular marketing literature it is generally acknowledged that CSR should positively 
affect customers’ brand perceptions (e.g. Rust, Zeithaml & Lemon, 2000). Importantly, Holt et 
al. (2004) argue that social responsibility is an important driver of global brand evaluations. 
However, the driving role of CSR to customers on BE depends on the credibility of such policies. 
Multinational companies that market global brands are often accused of seeking to maximize 7 
 
their corporate profits without much regard for the needs of the poorer and weaker societies in 
which they operate, e.g. Nike's sweat-shop labor, Coca-Cola's alleged water exploitation, etc. 
(Knight & Greenberg, 2002; Hills & Welford, 2005). Such problems may appear in visible CSR 
initiatives that are connected to benefit salience (Yoon et al., 2006), where firms are believed to 
use CSR for their own self-interest only (Prout, 2006). Hence, in this situation it is important to 
achieve credibility in CSR initiatives in order to ensure effectiveness in the implementation of 
CSR policies that are connected to firms’ core business (Yoon et al., 2006). 
Within the marketing literature there is ample evidence that customer beliefs concerning 
CSR affect individual customer outcomes, such as brand preference, brand loyalty, positive word-
of-mouth etc.  Evidence is also provided by Hoeffler and Keller (2002) and Keller (2003), who 
both report that corporate social marketing can enhance customer brand metrics, such as brand 
awareness, brand image, brand credibility and brand engagement. Lichtenstein, Drumwright and 
Braig (2004) showed that customers of a grocery chain that has stronger CSR beliefs tend to be 
more loyal to that chain. In the same vein Du et al. (2007a) report that visible CSR leads to 
stronger brand identification, brand loyalty and brand advocacy. Recently, Vlachos, Tsamakos, 
Vrechopoulos and Avramidis (2009) showed associations between CSR and repeat patronage 
intentions and recommendation intentions. This kind of customer loyalty connected to CSR acts 
as an implicit brand insurance, which is particularly valuable for global brands that are subject to 
changing social expectations, affluence, and globalization (Werther & Chandler, 2005). As these 
authors quote “CSR is about incorporating common sense policies into corporate strategy, 
culture, and day-today decision making to meet stakeholders’ needs, broadly defined. It is about 
creating strategies that will make firms and their brands more successful in their turbulent 
environments. Stripped of the emotionalism and name calling, we see strategic CSR as global 
brand insurance”. Remarkably, given the risks that controversies in one subsidiary of global 
brands may affect the full organization, it is particularly relevant for such global brands to be 
perceived as credible organizations in terms of CSR policies. Being labeled as socially responsible 8 
 
organizations, will prevent the spread of a bad image when a local problem occurs, which may 
seriously damage a global brand image. Hence, all these studies support the positive main effects 
of CSR on multiple customer brand metrics, particularly for global brands. 
Our second line of reasoning concerns the link between CSR and a brand’s financial 
performance. Orlitzky et al. (2003) theorize on two potential routes through which CSR may 
affect financial performance. The first path is through the improvement of capabilities and 
competencies within the firm. Building on the resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991), 
they argue that CSR requires and thus improves managerial competencies, such as improved 
scanning skills, processes and information systems, which increase the organization’s preparedness 
for external changes, turbulence and crisis. Such competencies are particularly relevant for 
managing global brands, as these operate in different environments. The other route concerns the 
improvement of reputation among its stakeholders. Specifically, CSR, when credible, may build a 
positive image among customers (as discussed above), investors, bankers and suppliers (Fombrun 
& Shanley, 1990; Sen et al., 2006). In such a setting, customer loyalty increases, thus enhancing 
firm value. Also, CSR initiatives, when credible, reduce information asymmetries and monitoring 
needs, which are particularly acute in large and complex organizations -those that typically 
support global brands- (Zajac & Westphal, 1994). The reduction in such information 
asymmetries will favor non-customer stakeholders to make costly firm-specific investment for 
providing valuable resources which will in turn generate BE. In their meta-analysis Orlitzky et al. 
(2003) indeed show a positive correlation between CSR and financial performance.   
In short, the above discussion shows that there is ample evidence that CSR, particularly 
when visible and credible, can affect customer brand metrics and financial brand performance 
metrics. Hence, we formally hypothesize: 
H1: CSR positively affects global brand equity. 
2.3 Differential effects of CSR  2.3 Differential effects of CSR  2.3 Differential effects of CSR  2.3 Differential effects of CSR i i i initiatives  nitiatives  nitiatives  nitiatives to to to to       different stakeholders different stakeholders different stakeholders different stakeholders       9 
 
In our discussion of the main effect of CSR on BE, we consider CSR as one broad, overarching 
construct. However, as already noted, CSR involves multiple initiatives to different stakeholders 
(Sen et al., 2006). In this research, we specifically distinguish CSR initiatives to: the community, 
customers, shareholders (labeled as corporate governance), employees and suppliers. These five 
stakeholders are frequently mentioned in different studies on CSR as important stakeholders (e.g. 
Orlitzky et al., 2003; Bhattacharya & Sen, 2004; Sen et al., 2006). So far no studies have 
explicitly studied the differential effects of CSR initiatives to these different stakeholders. 
However, the meta-analytic results of Orliztky et al. (2003) suggest differential effects between 
CSR initiatives. They specifically report that philanthropic donations aimed at the community 
were more strongly related to financial performance than all other CSR initiatives studied.  
  Wood and Jones (1995) argue that differential effects of CSR initiatives on performance 
may occur, because expectations and evaluations of CSR may differ from one stakeholder group 
to another. They further argue that there should be no mismatch between the CSR stakeholder 
measures used and the studied outcome measure. Hence, they suggest the existence of a positive 
relationship between CSR initiatives to market-oriented stakeholders (i.e. customers) and market 
measures. Applying this reasoning to our study one could argue that CSR initiatives relevant for 
customers should have a stronger effect than other CSR initiatives on our global BE measure, 
which is partially based on customer metrics. In line with this, Bhattacharya and Sen (2004, p. 
14) argue that companies need to identify what customers consider to be CSR-related activities 
and ascertain the resources devoted to such activities. 
  An additional explanation for differential effects builds on the visibility reasoning. CSR 
initiatives may differ in their visibility (Burke & Logsdon, 1996). While initiatives to customers 
may be rather visible in the market place, initiatives to internal stakeholders (i.e. employees) and 
external stakeholders higher up in the supply chain (i.e. suppliers, investors) will be less visible to 
consumers. Moreover, such differentials in visibility are amplified in global brands given that they 
are closely monitored by mass-media (Clinard & Yeager, 2006). Prior research has acknowledged 10 
 
the importance of CSR awareness. Du et al. (2007a, p. 238) explicitly state: “CSR awareness, or 
the lack thereof, is a key stumbling deficiency in most CSR strategies” (see also Bhattacharya & 
Sen, 2004; Du, Bhattacharya & Sen, 2010; Maignan & Ralston, 2002; Maignan & Ferrel, 2004). 
However, visibility of CSR initiatives may be less beneficial for the brand when CSR initiatives 
are related with the company’s business (e.g. a cigarette producer sponsoring a cancer fund) 
increasing the salience of firm-serving benefits (Yoon et al., 2006). In order to eliminate these 
backfire effects, the combination of visible CSR initiatives directed at customers to credible CSR 
less related to a firm’s core business is of particular value. One example of the latter CSR 
initiatives is CSR to community. In this line, studying the results of a CSR initiative focusing on 
the community of Crest toothpaste, Du, Bhattacharya & Sen (2007b) show that this initiative 
builds credibility and customer loyalty which, in turn, enhance brand value. 
  A last line of reasoning is based on Granovetter’s (1983) analysis, which suggests that 
distant connections among units in a large organization (those of global brands) are more 
informative than strong connections in explaining firm behavior. A firm’s real ethical 
commitment can be inferred from the behavior of a firm with regard to its loosely connected 
stakeholders in terms of direct interests such as local communities. Such (secondary) stakeholders 
are particularly distant from the interest of global brands’ headquarters, which may function as a 
more credible signal of lack of self-interest.5 The consequence is that CSR to communities 
should have a significant effect on the generation of BE through customers’ decisions, particularly 
when combined with visible CSR to customers, given that the latter are increasingly more aware 
of buying products from firms that follow a credible CSR policy (Christmann, 2004). 
  Based on the above visibility and credibility rationales, we expect that CSR initiatives to 
customers and the community should have a stronger effect on BE than initiatives to suppliers, 
                            
5 Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen (2009) differentiate between two types of stakeholder: primary, who are essential to 
the operation of the business, and secondary, who can influence the firm’s primary stakeholders. In particular, 
customers, employees, suppliers, and shareholders constitute primary stakeholders, and broader groups, such as the 
community, constitute secondary stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995; Greenley, Hooley & Rudd, 2005; Mitchell, Agle & 
Wood, 1997). 11 
 
investors and employees. However, we emphasize that we do not expect null effects of these latter 
initiatives. As discussed in our previous section, CSR initiatives to any stakeholder group create a 
firm’s competitive advantage through stakeholder provision of valuable intangible resources that, 
in turn, create firm value (Orlitzky et al., 2003; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998). Beyond that, also, 
improved reputations among employees, investors and suppliers may benefit the firm (e.g. 
Orlitzky et al., 2003; Langerak, 2001; Kaufman, Jayachandran & Rose, 2006; Srivastava, 
Shervani & Fahey, 1998). We thus hypothesize as follows: 
H2: CSR initiatives to community, customers, investors, employees, and suppliers each have a 
positive effect on global brand equity. 
H3: CSR initiatives to the community and customers have a stronger effect on global brand 
equity than CSR initiatives to investors, employees, and suppliers. 
 
2.4 Moderating role of CSR  2.4 Moderating role of CSR  2.4 Moderating role of CSR  2.4 Moderating role of CSR to to to to       the the the the       c c c community ommunity ommunity ommunity       
Previous research has emphasized the importance of implementing a credible CSR to ensure that 
CSR attracts the attention of different stakeholders (Lewellyn, 2002; Logsdon & Wood, 2002; 
Mahon, 2002). CSR practices geared to the community undoubtedly satisfy the firm’s credibility 
(Du et al., 2007b; Vlachos et al., 2009), as these initiatives clearly go beyond the direct interest 
of the firm. Also, as mentioned, a firm’s real commitment in maintaining a CSR policy to 
different stakeholders can be most clearly inferred from the relationship of a firm to distant units 
(Granovetter, 1983), over which the direct interest of a firm is less clear, particularly in the case 
of global brands. We can identify secondary stakeholders such as local community as “distant” 
stakeholders with regard to the interests of headquarters in global brands multinationals, whereas 
CSR policies to customers could be considered as having a direct relevance for the firm through 
creating more satisfied customers, for example. Remarkably the credibility of CSR to community 
is not only important for visible CSR initiatives such as those directed at customers but also for 
“internal” stakeholders such as employees and suppliers. These stakeholders will be more willing 12 
 
to make specific investments in order to provide valuable intangible assets when a firm has built a 
reputation of credibility in social issues. In these firms the hold up problem related to firm-
specific investments is less acute. The above reasoning applies particularly to global brands, where 
organizations that support them are large and they are more likely to suffer information 
asymmetries that require intensive monitoring (Zajac & Westphal, 1994), which are at the basis 
of agency problems preventing the aforementioned firm-specific investments. Thus, the 
effectiveness of CSR initiatives to other stakeholders will increase when firms, particularly global 
brands, have implemented CSR practices to the community. Other stakeholders will then develop 
a sentiment of fairness, which generates the credibility of CSR initiatives (Geyskens, Steenkamp 
& Kumar, 1998; Vlachos et al., 2009; Sen et al., 2006) improving their effectiveness. CSR on the 
community to generate trust to other stakeholders fits global brands particularly well. For these 
firms, a strategy of integrating perceived brand globalness with the development of local symbols 
through relationships to local communities leads to a more profitable strategy than a pure global 
standardization strategy (Alden, Steenkamp & Batra, 2006).  
Based on the above reasoning, we propose that CSR initiatives to the community will 
reinforce the positive effects (positive moderation) of CSR to others stakeholders on global BE. 
Note that such credibility argument related to communities is particularly important for global 
brands given the risks they bear from controversies in some subsidiaries of their network affecting 
the overall organization. As extensively discussed by Knight and Greenberg (2002) for Nike, the 
negative social performance towards employees in developing countries might damage the overall 
reputation of Nike, hence, it is particularly important for such global brands devoting credible 
community-oriented CSR. We thus hypothesize: 
H4: Firms’ CSR to the community positively moderates the effects of CSR to other stakeholders 
(customers, shareholders, suppliers, and employees) on global BE.   
3. Data set 3. Data set 3. Data set 3. Data set       13 
 
Our sample combines panel data from two databases. First, the SGP database (formerly SiRi 
Pro) is the largest publicly available international database specializing in the analysis of socially 
responsible investments in Europe and North America. The SGP database provides information 
on 199 items that cover major stakeholder issues, such as community involvement, customer 
policies, employment relations, corporate governance, supplier relations, ethical issues, and 
controversial activities. The data come from interviews by Sustainalytics specialists.6 The second 
database is Interbrand, which provides information on the global BE of the most valuable 
companies (see http://www.interbrand.com). Combining both databases leaves us with an 
unbalanced panel data of 57 global brands from 10 different countries for the period 2002–
2008. The initial unbalanced panel of 357 observations 7 is reduced to 243 because we lose 2 
years (114 observations) as we lag the dependent variable by one period in order to study long-
term effects. The second year is lost in the instrumentation of the endogenous variables given that 
we take instrumental variables that are constructed using specifications that include up to 2 
lagged variables (see the Methodology section). In the final sample there is an average of 4 
observations per firm. Such figure ensures that the panel is relatively balanced. 
The distribution of the 57 firms and 243 observations among countries is as follows: the 
United States (35 firms and 145 -59.67%- of observations); Germany (6 firms and 26 -
10.70%- of observations); Japan (6 firms and 26 -10.70%- of observations); France (3 firms and 
13 -5.35%- of observations); the United Kingdom (2 firms and 8 -3.29%- of observations); 
Switzerland (1 firm and 5 -2.06%- of observations); Finland (1 firm and 5 -2.06%- 
observations), Korea (1 firm and 5 -2.06%- observations); Italy (1 firm and 5 -2.06%- 
observations) and the Netherlands (1 firm and 5 -2.06%- observations). In terms of distribution 
among sectors (one-digit Standard Industrial Classification [SIC]), the frequencies are as follow: 
mining and construction (SIC = 1): (1 firm and 4-1.65%- observations); manufacturing: 
                            
6 For further information on the SGP database see http://www.sustainalytics.com/. 
7 The complete panel would have been 399 observations. The reduction to 357 observations is because for 14 firms, 
values are missing in different years in some of the variables that we need to estimate our specifications, mainly the 
variable on R&D. 14 
 
tobacco, beverage, printing, chemicals (SIC = 2): (16 firms and 68 -27.98%- observations); 
manufacturing: metal, machinery, electronics and optics (SIC = 3): (26 firms and 111 -45.68%- 
observations); public services: transportation, radio, television, electric, gas sanitary (SIC = 4): (4 
firms and 17 -7.00%- observations); wholesale and retail trade (SIC = 5): (4 firms and 17 -
7.00%- observations); services (SIC = 7): (5 firms and 22 -9.05%- observations); and public 
administration (SIC = 8): (1 firm and 4 -1.65%- observations). 
 
3.1 Variables 3.1 Variables 3.1 Variables 3.1 Variables       
We measure the dependent variable, Brand Equity (BE), with the Interbrand score. Interbrand’s method 
for valuing global brands consists of three analyses: financial, role of brand, and brand strength. 
The financial analysis forecasts current and future revenues attributed to the branded products, 
less the costs of doing business (e.g. operating costs, taxes) and intangibles (e.g. patents, 
management strength), to assess the portion of earnings due to the brand. The role of the brand 
constitutes a measure of how the brand influences customer demand at the point of purchase. 
Finally, brand strength provides a benchmark of the brand’s ability to secure ongoing customer 
demand (loyalty, repurchase, and retention) and sustain future earnings, which translates branded 
earnings into net present value. This assessment provides a structured way to determine specific 
risks to the strength of the global brands.8 
  Keller and Lehmann (2003; 2006) divide existing measures of BE into three categories: 
customer mind-set, product market, and financial market outcomes. The measure for this study 
integrates product market and financial market outcomes, which makes the measure more 
“complete” than a single-category measure (see Ailawadi, Lehmann & Neslin, 2003). In addition, 
the Interbrand measure addresses criticisms concerning the lack of objectivity in BE measures 
                            
8 From 2007 on, rebalancing occurs in the weights of the seven components on which the BE measure relies: 
leadership, stability, support, protection, market, trend, and internationality. To account for this discontinuity in the 
methodology, in the estimations we include a dummy variable that equals 1 for the years beyond or equal to 2007 
and 0 for the years before 2007. In addition, we estimate specification (1) separating the sample into two subperiods 
(2002–2006 and 2007–2008). The results remain consistent. Further details on the methodology to compute the 
BE are available at http://www.interbrand.com. 15 
 
based exclusively on customer mind-set (Ailawadi et al., 2003). Besides, Madden et al. (2006) 
defend the use of Interbrand data. Moreover, the Interbrand measure is widely used and 
influential (Farris, Bendle, Pfeifer & Reibstein, 2006; Haigh & Perrier, 1997). However, this 
measure is not free from criticism. First, it only considers a small selection of strong (global) 
brands, and does not include weak brands (Chu & Keh, 2006; Madden et al., 2006). Second, the 
Interbrand measure is proprietary (Farris et al., 2006), unlike the other frequently used Y&R 
Brand Asset Value measure, which is based on surveys of consumers regarding their attitudes 
concerning brands (e.g. Mizik & Jacobson, 2008). 
  The independent variables include CSR practices geared to a range of stakeholders: 
community, customers, employees, suppliers, and shareholders. As proxies for community, 
customer, corporate governance, employees, and suppliers, we compute the weighted average of 
those items shown in Table 1.9 The weights are sector-specific and are determined by SGP 
analysts. They take into consideration the potential negative effect of a firm’s operations in the 
different items of each stakeholder. The weight is assigned in proportion to this potential. Once 
normalized, the result is a continuous-type variable between 0 and 100%. 10 The SGP database 
also provides an overall rating on CSR by weighting the score of the different stakeholders (see 
the Appendix for an example of how these scores are computed). The resulting score is a proxy 
for the overall intensity in the implementation of social responsible policies.  
                            
9 We conducted internal consistency and dimensionality tests to assess the reliability of these proxies. On internal 
consistency, the reliability coefficients (Cronbach's alphas) for the five measures of stakeholders are greater than 
0.90, indicating that the proxies are internally consistent with the underlying factor of the different stakeholders’ 
satisfaction. In particular, reliability coefficients are 0.947 for the community, 0.942 for customers, 0.975 for 
corporate governance, 0.973 for employees and 0.918 for suppliers. For dimensionality, we also included the set of 
indicators of one factor as indicators in another factor; their individual correlations in almost all cases are below 0.5, 
indicating the unidimensionality in the loadings. 
10 For example, the items that are more related to practical issues involving the community are weighted more heavily 
for public services: transportation, radio, television, electric, gas, sanitary (SIC = 4) rather than for manufacturing: 
tobacco, beverage (SIC=2). 16 
 
  We include ROA and R&D as controls (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Chu & Keh, 
2006)11; risk as it relates to a firm’s leverage (Rego, Billett & Morgan, 2009); and size, which is a 
proxy for a firm’s visibility -BE value is connected to a firm’s visibility- (Godfrey et al., 2009). See 
Table 1 for definitions. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] [Insert Table 1 about here] [Insert Table 1 about here] [Insert Table 1 about here] 
3.2 Methodology 3.2 Methodology 3.2 Methodology 3.2 Methodology       
We test our hypotheses by relying on a specification that explains global BE value in terms of the 
different dimensions of a firm’s CSR and a set of control variables. In particular, we consider the 
following specification, which also includes interactive terms, to test Hypothesis 4: 
it 0 it-1 1 it 2 it 3 it
4 it 5 it 6 it
7 it 8 i
BrandEquity BrandEquity Community + Customer + Corporate governance +
Employees + Suppliers + Community × Customer +
Community × Corporate governance Community × Employees





9 it 10 it 11 it 12 it
13 it
Community × Suppliers Size + ROA + Leverage +
R&D (sec , , ) i it Controls tor year country






where i and t index firm and year, respectively; controls (sector, year, country) are a set of dummy variables 
that capture temporal, sector and country effects;  i η  is the possible firm-specific component of the error 
term; and  it ε  is the error term.12 
  This specification has three caveats. First, a correlation might exist between unobservable firm-
specific error term  i η  and some of the explanatory variables (fixed-effect problem). For example, the 
characteristics of the manager (which are time invariant) may influence the CSR policy as well as the global 
brand value. In this case, the relationship between CSR policies and global BE would be spurious and 
based on their mutual connection with managerial characteristics ( i η ). We examine the relevance of this 
                            
11 Investment in R&D improves a firm’s technology capability which, on the one hand, can accommodate better 
products to consumer preferences and, on the other, improves productivity which, in turn, increases financial 
performance. Both features lead to an increase in a firm’s BE. 
12 We assume the same carryover effects for all stakeholders. Our assumption of no differential lags on the impact of 
the different stakeholders’ satisfaction on BE relies on our theoretical framework, in which we posit that all 
stakeholders have an impact on BE without differentiating temporal lags among them. This assumption is widely 
used in the literature connecting social performance with financial performance (see the meta-analyses of Margolis & 
Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky et al., 2003). 17 
 
fixed effect in our specification using the Hausman test. The result of this test is that we can estimate 
specification (1) using random-effect estimations, which are more efficient than fixed-effect ones.13 
  Second, the previous estimation may have reverse causality problems: BE value may help firms 
obtain resources from financial markets to be devoted to social issues (i.e. slack theory; see McGuire, 
Sundgren & Schneeweis, 1988; Waddock & Graves, 1997). We address this endogeneity concern 
related to reverse causality by using instruments of the potential endogenous variables (the overall CSR 
score, Community, Customer, Corporate governance, Employees, and Suppliers). To construct such 
instruments, we run an estimation of each potential endogenous variable in terms of the following 
explanatory variables: the corresponding dependent variable lagged by one and two periods 
respectively,14 Size, ROA, Leverage and R&D intensity as defined in Table 1. Once we run such 
estimations, we compute the predicted value of each estimation.15 Such predicted variables are taken 
as instruments of the endogenous variables. Note that there are two conditions that a good instrument has 
to satisfy. First, an instrument should show a high correlation with the instrumented variable and, second, 
an instrument should show null correlation with the error term in the specification explaining BE. The 
predicted values computed using the lagged values of the endogenous variables (CSR and 
different stakeholders’ satisfaction variables) as well as control variables are, by construction, 
highly correlated with the instrumented variables given the inertia of a firm’s CSR policy.16 
Besides, we do not expect such instruments to be correlated with the error term in the specification 
of BE. Note that once we compute the predicted value of each endogenous variable, we are 
imposing that the error term of the corresponding specification is equal to 0. Thus, we are 
                            
13 We also rely on random-effect estimations because of the persistence in the variables related to CSR policies (low 
intertemporal variability). This persistence makes fixed-effect estimations, which are based on differences along time, 
particularly inefficient. Additionally, there is high inertia in the dependent variable –BE–, which is captured by the 
high value of the  0 α  parameter that measures adjustment costs. 
14 We have included up to 2 lagged-period variables in the estimations used for constructing the instruments because 
of the presence of the dependent variable (BE) lagged by one period as explanatory in specification (1). 
15 These predicted values are the result of multiplying the different estimated coefficients times the explanatory 
variables taken in their mean value of the distribution. 
16 The coefficients of the lagged dependent variables in all specifications are larger than 0.6 with p<.01. The variable 
that shows the greatest persistence is the community, with a coefficient of 0.647. These figures are indicative of the 
significant correlation between the instruments and the instrumented (CSR) variables. 18 
 
eliminating the part of the endogenous (CSR and different stakeholders’ satisfaction) variables 
that is not explained by the lagged dependent variables up to 2 periods as well as the control 
ones. This unexplained part is, by construction, very likely to be connected to the error term in 
specification (1) of BE. The elimination of this error component allows also eliminating the 
correlation between the error term in specification (1) of BE variable and the instruments 
(predicted variables). Then, both conditions of an instrument are satisfied.17  
  Third, we estimate a partial adjustment model (Hanssens, Parsons & Schultz, 2001) in 
which we include the dependent variable lagged by one period. The inclusion of this variable enables us 
to tackle adjustment costs associated with changes in a firm’s brand value. The implicit assumption is that 
firms approach an optimal level of BE with some adjustment costs. In addition, with this approach we can 
compute both long-term and short-term effects.18 One criticism of this model is that the error 
terms may be correlated along time. We test for this possibility and we do find that a first-order 
correlation exists in the error term. Thus, we conduct a general least squares (GLS) random-
effect estimation, specifying both AR(1) autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the error term. 
In the estimations we cluster the error term at firm level. 
Hypothesis 1 is confirmed when the coefficient of CSR in explaining BE is significantly positive. 
We test Hypothesis 2 if  1 2 3 4 5 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 and α α α α α > > > > >  according to specification (1).19 
Hypothesis 3 is tested if  1 2 3 4 5 , ( , , ) Max α α α α α > . Finally, we test Hypothesis 4 with the coefficients 
6 7 8 9 , , , α α α α  of the terms that result when we cross the variable Community times the variables that 
capture CSR policy with respect to the remaining stakeholders (Customer, Corporate governance, 
                            
17 Additionally, and in accordance with the previous two conditions, we have also conducted two tests, which are 
reported in Table 3, to measure the relevance of the instruments as well as their exogeneity. First, we show an F-test 
developed by Stock and Yogo (2005) that measures the explanatory power of the instruments of the endogenous 
variable. The second is the Hansen test to contrast the overidentification restriction, that is, whether instruments are 
orthogonal to the error term (Bascle, 2008). All instruments pass the previous tests as shown in Table 3. 
18 The partial adjustment model proposed assumes that all dimensions of CSR are short-term as well as long-term 
determinants of BE. This conforms to our theoretical framework where our theoretical contentions apply to short-
term as well as long-term scenarios. 
19 The coefficients that capture the long-term effects are:  3 5 1 2 4
0 0 0 0 0
, , , ,
1 1 1 1 1
α α α α α
α α α α α − − − − −
  19 
 
Employees, and Suppliers). Hypothesis 4 is confirmed when  6 7 8 9 , , , α α α α   are significantly positive 
and there is a significant improvement in the
2 R from the model without interactions. 
       
3.3 Results 3.3 Results 3.3 Results 3.3 Results       
Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 shows the means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values, and the correlations of the 
variables used in specification (1). The correlation matrix shows that BE is positively correlated with all 
stakeholders and mainly with Community (25%) and Customers (20%). This evidence is in line with 
Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3. However, we cannot extract definitive conclusions from this preliminary analysis 
given that such correlation analysis does not control for the possibility of spurious connections related to 
variables like Size. In addition, among the control variables, large firms, more profitable firms, firms that 
invest in R&D are all positively correlated with BE.  Almost all correlations between the explanatory 
variables are below 0.7020, and the variance inflation factors are below 10 except for the term 
Community x Customer (10.27) indicating that multicollinearity is not a critical problem.21 
[ [ [ [Insert  Insert  Insert  Insert Table  Table  Table  Table 2 2 2 2       about  about  about  about here] here] here] here]       
Main Effects of CSR 
Table 3 shows the results of model specification (1). Column 1 includes the aggregate 
score of CSR as an explanatory variable; in column 2, we disaggregate this variable in its different 
dimensions (Community, Customer, Corporate governance, Employees and Suppliers). In both cases, we 
use the instrumental variables, as we explained in the Methodology section (3.2). 
                            
20Four correlations involving interaction terms are slightly above the threshold of 0.70. In order to test whether this 
feature generates serious multicollinearity problems, we have re-estimated the complete specification using a dummy 
D_Community instead of the continuous variable Community. The previous dummy is equal to 1 (0) when 
community is above (below) the mean value for the corresponding sector and year. The interaction terms with such 
dummy show correlations below 0.70, hence, multicollinearity is less problematic. Remarkably, the results using such 
alternative interaction terms are similar to those shown in Table 3. 
21 Consistently with the lack of multicollinearity problems, we have conducted the Belsley (1991) test, which 
establishes that a condition number above 30 is a signal of multicollinearity problems. In our case, the condition 
number for the full specification –model of column 3 in Table 3 (instruction cndnmb3 in STATA) is 23.7. 
Additionally, we conducted different estimations that include single interaction terms that cross Community times 
the different stakeholders, and we compared the results with those of the complete specification of column 3 in 
Table 3 which includes all of the interaction terms (available upon request). The coefficients found in the different 
specifications are quite stable, which is indicative of the lack of serious multicollinearity problems.  20 
 
We find that a firm’s CSR has a positive impact on BE ( 0 0.657, 0.01 p α = < ). For the 
different dimensions of a firm’s CSR (see column 2), we find that Community 
( 1 0.725, 0.01 p α = < ), Customer ( 2 0.544, 0.01 p α = < ), Corporate governance 
( 3 0.510, 0.01 p α = < ), Employees ( 4 0.491, 0.01 p α = < ), and Suppliers (
5 0.511, 0.01 p α = < ) 
have a positive effect on a firm’s BE value. The above results support Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Community and customer CSR have indeed the largest effects on BE (column 2 of Table 
3).  However, the t-tests show no significant differences between any of the coefficients 
compared (all p-values >.10).22 Hence, we find no significant empirical support for hypothesis 3.  
Among the control variables, large firms that are more visible ( 10 0.060 0.01 with p α = < ), 
more profitable ( 11 0.032 0.10 with p α = < ) and firms that invest in R&D 
( 13 0.095 0.05 with p α = < ), which creates intangible assets, have higher BE values. 
Finally, the inclusion of the lagged term of BE in our model, allows assessing the long-term 
effects of CSR activities. The significant coefficient of  it-1 Brand Equity  in column 2 of Table 3 
( 0 0.910, 0.01 p α = < ) indicates that all stakeholders are significant determinants of long-term 















































) for Suppliers.  
Interaction Effects with CSR community 
Column 3 of Table 4 shows the tests of Hypothesis 4 and includes four alternative 
interaction terms (Community × Customers, Community × Corporate governance, Community 
                            
22 We are using  { } { }
{ } { }
1,2 3,4,5
2 2
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statistic to test significant differences between the coefficients of 
Community and Customers (
1 2 and α α ) and those of Corporate governance, Employees and Suppliers 
(
3 4 5 , and α α α ). 21 
 
× Employees, and Community × Suppliers). These variables test the possible moderating effect 
of Community on the different stakeholders to BE.  
In accordance with column 2, all stakeholders have positive impacts on a firm’s BE. 
Regarding the interactive terms, we have found that Community, interacted with the remaining 
stakeholders’ variables, enhances the positive impact of these latter variables on BE. In particular, 
Community positively moderates the effect of Customer on BE ( 6 0.004 0.01 with p α = < ). 
Hence, although we do not find larger effects of CSR to community and CSR to customers with 
respect to other stakeholders, we do find that the combination of CSR to community and 
customers generate larger effects on BE than other stakeholders do individually.23 By the same 
token, Community plays a positive moderating role in the connection from shareholder value 
(Corporate governance) to BE value ( 7 0.002 0.05 with p α = < ). These results also hold for 
employees ( 8 0.0015 0.05 with p α = < ) and suppliers ( 9 0.0019 0.10 with p α = < ). 
Remarkably, the moderating effect of community is larger when combined to CSR to customers 
than when combined to other stakeholders.24 This result confirms our statement that the effects 
of credible CSR policies (i.e. CSR to community) will have particularly large effects when 
combined to visible CSR policies like those of CSR to customers. 
Finally, the coefficient of the dependent variable lagged by one period is still significant 
with 0.01 p < , and thus we can state that the previous moderating results also hold for long-term 
analysis. All these results confirm Hypothesis 4. 
Concerning the model fit, 
2 R  is very high (98.97%) and this is an improvement on the 
model of column 2 (
2 3.04, 0.034) R p ∆ = = , which indicates that Community plays a 
                            
23 In the specification of column 3, we will also see that Community x Customers generates larger effects not only to 
other individual stakeholders, but also to the combination of these latter stakeholders to Community. 
24 When we compare the coefficient of Community x Customer to Community x Corp. governance, the t-test of 
differences shows a p-value=0.025. Such p-value is 0.020 for the comparison between Community x Customer and 
Community x Employees. Finally, the comparison between Community x Customer and Community x Suppliers 
leads to a p-value =0.059. 22 
 
significant moderating role in the model of column 3. 25 Remarkably, once we extract the lagged 
dependent variable from the specification, the
2 R  decreases to 49.72% -approximately one half 
of the explanatory power is due to the lagged dependent variable. This is evidence that there is 
considerable inertia in BE, indicating that CSR investment has long-lasting effects on BE value. 
[Insert Table 3 ab [Insert Table 3 ab [Insert Table 3 ab [Insert Table 3 about here] out here] out here] out here] 
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4.1 Discussion of  4.1 Discussion of  4.1 Discussion of  4.1 Discussion of r r r results esults esults esults       
In this paper, we analyze the effect of different dimensions of a firm’s corporate social 
responsible (CSR) policy on the creation of global brand equity (BE). Studying CSR for global 
brands is highly relevant, as global brands are frequently blamed for not having strong CSR 
records. Our study using a longitudinal database of 57 global brands in various industries and 10 
different countries shows strong effects of CSR initiatives directed at different stakeholders on 
global BE. Below, we discuss our most important results and reflect on the implications for the 
management of global brands. 
  First, we find that CSR positively affects global BE. This is an important extension of 
the previous literature on CSR, as it is the first study to actually show this effect in an 
international setting. This result confirms prior studies showing that CSR affects firm 
performance (e.g. Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky et al., 2003). 
Moreover, we also show that CSR directed at stakeholders, generates a positive effect on both 
short-term and long-term BE value.  
  Second, CSR to community and to customers do not have a significantly larger effect on 
a firm’s global BE than the other CSR efforts. However, the combination of both CSR policies 
                            
25 Such a high value in 
2 R  is similar to other studies that include the lagged dependent variable as explanatory. For 
example, Sriram, Balachander and Kalwani (2007) found an 
2 R  of 92% in an estimation of BE in terms of that 
variable lagged by one period as well as a variable of advertising innovations and sales promotion. 23 
 
(to customers and to the community) do have a larger impact on BE than CSR to other 
stakeholders. These results do not confirm that CSR initiatives that are more visible or credible 
in the market place have a greater effect on BE. Nevertheless, they do confirm that joint CSR 
initiatives combining visibility (customers) and credibility (the community) have a stronger effect 
on such a marketing metric as global BE than other combinations. This result confirms claims 
made by Wood and Jones (1995) that there should be a match between the CSR initiative and 
the outcome measure. Besides, the insignificance in the differences of our findings on the direct 
effects for the different stakeholders can potentially be attributed to the relatively small number 
of firms in our sample. Beyond that, we may argue that “internal” stakeholders such as employees 
and suppliers are as important as community and customers given that the latter provide the type 
of valuable intangible resources which are the basis of a firm’s competitive advantage, which, in 
turn, enhance a firm’s BE. Another explanation might be that, as already noted, CSR visibility can 
also have some negative effects, as it may induce a stronger salience of self-benefit firm motives of 
CSR (Yoon et al., 2006). This is the reason why it is particularly important to combine visible 
CSR (directed at customers) with credible CSR (directed at the community). 
Third, the importance of CSR to communities is, however, emphasized by the 
interaction effects that have been found of CSR to the community and CSR initiatives to other 
stakeholders and particularly to customers. These results point to the indirect beneficial effect of 
CSR to community. The satisfaction of community interests gives credibility to a firm as an 
entity with an ethical stance to all stakeholders (Godfrey et al., 2009). Such gained reputation has 
a direct value of its own, particularly to global brands, given that in the event of shocks 
generating controversies in parts of the organization, a gained reputation in social issues may 
prevent the spread of a bad image throughout the organization that may seriously damage a 
global brand image. The indirect effect of CSR to community is a reinforcing mechanism 
(positive moderator), in terms of the positive impact of satisfying all stakeholders’ interests on 
BE. Such a reinforcing mechanism reflects the trust that derives from firms applying credible 24 
 
CSR practices to secondary stakeholders (Logsdon & Wood, 2002). Furthermore, connections 
to distant stakeholders are more informative than connections to closer ones in assessing a firm’s 
credibility on its ethical stance (Granovetter, 1983). Therefore, a global brand that has gained 
trust through its relationship to community, will be capable of lending confidence to all of its 
stakeholders regarding its long-term commitment, which in turn will have a positive effect on its 
short-term and long-term BE value. Finally, we argue that for large and complex organizations 
that are behind global brands, information asymmetries and the need for monitoring are 
particularly important (Zajac & Westphal, 1994). In this framework, the implementation of 
credible CSR policies like those targeted to community will reduce opportunistic behaviors that 
emerge in information asymmetry contexts. The result is a creation of brand value. 
       
4. 4. 4. 4.2 2 2 2.  .  .  . Managerial implications Managerial implications Managerial implications Managerial implications       
Our findings provide several implications for managers. 
First, we demonstrate that global brand managers should indeed incorporate CSR as a 
main component into their brand equity-enhancing strategy, as Polonsky and Jevons (2009) 
suggest. Second, managers that wish to send visible and credible signals of commitment to 
enhance their firms’ global BE value should pay particular attention to the less salient 
stakeholders. That is, global brand management should give substantial weight to satisfying local 
community interests. To illustrate the importance of focusing on CSR for global brands and 
specifically the strong effects of CSR to the community, we have executed an analysis on the 
economic consequences of improving different CSR components. In economic terms, when we 
do not consider interaction effects, the marginal impact of CSR to Customer on BE is given by 
the coefficient ( 2 0.518, 0.01 p α = < ). However, when we consider interaction effects with 
Community, once we fix CSR to Community at its mean value of the distribution (58.16), the 
marginal effect of CSR to Customers on BE is given by the coefficient 25 
 
( 2 6 ( ) 0.518 0.004 58.16 0.751, 0.01 xMean Community x p α α + = + = < ). These coefficients mean 
that an increase in one standard deviation in Customer satisfaction (0.227) leads to an increase in 
$1752.24 million in BE26 -or an 11.76% increase from the mean value of BE ($14,900 million) 
without considering interaction effects. This figure increases to 17.04% ($2538.96 million) 
when we include the moderation of Community, which means that the moderating effect of 
Community is translated to a relative increase of 44.90% ($786.72 million) in BE value. When 
we apply the same type of analysis to Corporate governance, the numbers are a 9.57% increase 
when we do not consider interaction effects and a 12.20% increase ($1817.8 million) when we 
consider interaction effects and we fix Community at its mean value. For Employees, the increase 
is 8.09% when we do not consider interaction effects and 9.78% ($1457.22 million) when we 
consider interaction effects. Finally, for Suppliers the figures are 9.84% and 12.46% ($1856.54 
million) respectively. Thus, the variations in the different CSR dimensions lead to considerable 
economic variations in BE and particularly when Community moderates CSR to Customers. 
So, global brands that aim to improve BE with CSR should really develop CSR 
initiatives to communities that reinforce CSR initiatives with other stakeholders. CSR initiatives 
to the local community can be especially valuable, as they may fit in with existing global brand 
strategies. Specifically, firms can pursue a double strategy of creating a global brand with the 
development of symbols at a local level (Alden et al., 2006) through the satisfaction of local 
community interests. This is the sort of strategy followed by firms such as Coca Cola and 
Heineken, that are perceived simultaneously as global brands and firms with strong roots in the 
different national communities (Alden et al., 2006). 
Third, the relevance of CSR for global brands also has implications for their merger and 
acquisition strategies. Global brands that expand internationally and wish to create certain 
standards of CSR policies abroad should acquire firms with strong community roots. In short, 
                            
26 This number is found by performing 0.223 x 0.518 x 14900 = $1721.16 million. Note that the dependent 
variable BE is defined on a log scale and that the mean value of BE is $14900 million. 26 
 
global brand managers need to be aware that local satisfaction is at the root of improving global 
BE value. Such a strategy would eliminate fears of corporate expropriation by entrant firms in less 
developed countries. 
Lastly, one final implication is that managers should not focus on single-stakeholder 
CSR policies, particularly those managers of global brands. These multinational enterprises 
(MNE) should be particularly aware of maintaining a balance among different stakeholders in 
the generation of BE. Managers of global brands should not put excessive weight just on market-
oriented stakeholder-like customers. Brands are complex social phenomena, and thus managers 
that wish to sustain CSR policies to create global BE value should maintain a balance among the 
different stakeholders, rather than focus on a single stakeholder (Maio, 2003). That is, all 
components of CSR have a positive impact on global brands.        
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One of the limitations of our study is that the MNE analyzed are based in developed countries, 
which may question the generalizability of the results found. Moreover, the use of the Interbrand 
measure, which focuses on strong (global) brands strengthens this problem. However, the 
measurement approach of Interbrand, which is not based on customer surveys, but on proprietary 
information, may open the possibility of extracting information from subsidiaries of MNE 
operating in less developed countries. Nevertheless, we may speculate that the effect of 
conducting social responsible policies in developing countries is a more powerful signal to MNE 
commitment to stakeholders and we may expect that the effect on BE should even be clearer than 
that in developed countries. Further research should be extended to developing countries and 
emerging economies, such as Turkey, Brazil, and China (Burgess & Steenkamp, 2005). A second 
limitation is the dichotomous items used in the definition of the proxies on social responsibility 
to the different stakeholders. We have minimized such problem by averaging a broad set of items 
in order to obtain a continuous-type variable.  27 
 
Our findings reveal that satisfying community interests is highly relevant to creating and 
maintaining global brand value. A natural extension of our model would be to incorporate virtual 
communities into the analysis to determine whether the reinforcing effects linked to real 
communities also hold for these types of communities. Another avenue would be to include other 
stakeholders in the analysis. For example, research could assess whether the crucial role of CSR to 
one secondary stakeholder (community) differs from other secondary stakeholders, such as the 
environment. The absence of environment-related CSR in our measurement of CSR is a 
limitation. Hills and Welford (2005) discuss the relevance of the environment issue for Coca 
Cola, suggesting the potential relevance of this CSR issue in a global branding context. This is 
confirmed indirectly in our analysis given that some items in the community score refer to 
environmental issues. Finally, a contingency analysis on the economic cycle would be of interest. 
Following existing research on the consequences of the economic cycle (e.g. Lamey, Deleersnyder, 
Dekimpe & Steenkamp, 2007), it is of crucial importance to understand whether and which CSR 
policies become more or less relevant during economic recessions. Moreover, it would also be 
relevant to investigate whether the global BE of brands that have invested in CSR is less affected 
or may even benefit from strong market crises, such as the recent financial crisis. Initial case-
based evidence in the Dutch banking market suggests that the cooperative Rabobank with clear 
local community CSR initiatives has been less affected by the global crisis (Verhoef, Wesselius, 
Bügel & Wiesel, 2010). Future research could investigate this empirically. 
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Table 1. Definition of the variables Table 1. Definition of the variables Table 1. Definition of the variables Table 1. Definition of the variables       
Dependent Variables Dependent Variables Dependent Variables Dependent Variables       
Brand Equity 
The score that Interbrand provides for such issue is measured in million US 
$. Interbrand’s method of valuing brands consists of three analyses: financial, 
role of brand, and brand strength. Financial analysis forecasts current and 
future revenues attributed to the branded products, subtracting the costs of 
doing business (e.g. operating costs, taxes) and intangibles, such as patents 
and management strength, to assess the portion of earnings due to the brand. 
The role of the brand constitutes a measure of how the brand influences 
customer demand at the point of purchase. Finally, brand strength provides a 
benchmark of the brand’s ability to secure ongoing customer demand 
(loyalty, repurchase, and retention) and sustain future earnings, which 
translates branded earnings into net present value. This assessment provides a 
structured means to determine specific risks to the strength of the brands. 
We take this variable in logs in order to reduce skewness. 
Main Explanatory Variables: Main Explanatory Variables: Main Explanatory Variables: Main Explanatory Variables:       
Community  
Community satisfaction is the weighted average of the following 
items where Yes (Y) is tabulated as 100% and No (N) is tabulated as 
0: (1) Local community programs (Y/N); 
(2) Formal policy on local community involvement (Y/N); 
(3) Management responsibility for local community affairs (Y/N); 
(4) Formal volunteer programs (Y/N); (5) Programs for 
consultation with local communities (Y/N); (6) Percentage of 
donations directed at local communities. The weights are sector-
specific and they are determined by SGP’s analysts. They take into 
consideration the potential negative effect of a firm’s operations in 
the different items of Community’s interests. Once normalized, the 
result is a continuous-type variable between 0 and 100%. For those 
items that are not dichotomic variables, there are intermediate values: 
20% means marginal (first quartile), 40% means below the mean; 
50% in the mean; 60% above the mean; 80% clearly significant (last 
quartile). 
Customers 
Customers is the weighted average of the following items where Yes 
(Y) is tabulated as 100% and No (N) is tabulated as 0: (1) a formal 
policy statement noting customer issues (Y/N); 
(2) the existence of a formal policy with regard to product quality 
(Y/N); (3) whether a formal policy pertains to 
marketing/advertising practices (Y/N); (4) the existence of a formal 
policy on product safety (Y/N); (5) there is board responsibility for 
customer satisfaction (Y/N); 
(6) facilities with quality certification (Y/N); and (7) marketing 
practices designed to satisfy customers (Y/N). The weights are 
sector-specific and they are determined by SGP’s analysts. They take 
into consideration the potential negative effect of a firm’s operations 
in the different items of Customers’ interests. Once normalized, the 
result is a continuous-type variable between 0 and 100%. 
Corporate governance 
Corporate governance is the weighted average of the following items, 
where Yes (Y) is tabulated as 100% and No (N) is tabulated as 0: 
(1) Number of board committees; (2) Managerial stock ownership; 35 
 
(3) The company has corporate governance principles (Y/N); (4) 
Directors’ term of office; (5) Board performance evaluation (Y/N); 
(6) Number of NEDs in the Board; (7) Number of independent 
NEDs in the Board; (8) Separate position for chairman of board and 
CEO (Y/N); (9) “One share, one vote” principle (Y/N); (10) 
Absence of anti-takeover devices (Y/N). The weights are sector-
specific and they are determined by SGP’s analysts. They take into 
consideration the potential negative effect of a firm’s operations in 
the different items of Corporate Governance’s interests. Once 
normalized, the result is a continuous-type variable between 0 and 
100%. For those items that are not dichotomic variables, there are 
intermediate values: 20% means marginal (first quartile), 40% means 
below the mean; 50% in the mean; 60% above the mean; 80% clearly 
significant (last quartile). 
Employees  
Employees satisfaction is the weighted average of the following items, 
where Yes (Y) is tabulated as 100% and No (N) is tabulated as 0: 
(1) Policies/Principles regarding employees (Y/N); (2) Formal 
policy statement on health and safety (Y/N); (3) Formal policy on 
diversity/employment equity (Y/N); (4) Formal policy on freedom 
of association (Y/N); (5) Formal policy statement on child/forced 
labor (Y/N); (6) Formal policy statement on working hours (Y/N); 
(7) Formal policy statement on wages (Y/N); (8) Board 
responsibility for human resources issues (Y/N); (9) Specific health 
and safety targets (Y/N); (10) Diversity/Equal opportunity 
programs (Y/N); (11) Work/Life programs (Y/N); (12) Training 
programs (Y/N); (13) Participative management programs (Y/N); 
(14) Cash profit-sharing programs (Y/N); (15) Supervisory Board 
(NEDs) (Y/N). The weights are sector-specific and they are 
determined by SGP’s analysts. They take into consideration the 
potential negative effect of a firm’s operations in the different items 
of Employees’ interests. Once normalized, the result is a continuous-
type variable between 0 and 100%. 
Suppliers 
Suppliers satisfaction is the weighted average of the following items, 
where Yes (Y) is tabulated as 100% and No (N) is tabulated as 0: 
(1) Code of conduct for contractors (Y/N); (2) Board responsibility 
for contractors’ human rights (Y/N); 
(3) Contractors' awareness programs (Y/N); (4) Contractors with 
social certification (Y/N); (5) Health and safety programs among 
contractors (Y/N); (6) Freedom of association among contractors 
(Y/N); (7) Child/Forced labor among contractors (Y/N); (8) 
Discrimination among contractors (Y/N); 
(9) Employment conditions among contractors. The weights are 
sector-specific and they are determined by SGP’s analysts. They take 
into consideration the potential negative effect of a firm’s operations 
in the different items of Suppliers’ interests. Once normalized, the 
result is a continuous-type variable between 0 and 100%. For those 
items that are not dichotomic variables, there are intermediate values: 
20% means marginal (first quartile), 40% means below the mean; 




It is the weighted average of community, customer, corporate 
governance, employees, and suppliers scores. These weighs are the 
result of adding the different weights that are included in the policy 
and managerial procedures section of each stakeholder. The result is a 
continuous-type variable between 0 and 100%. 
Control variables: Control variables: Control variables: Control variables:       
Size  Total sales on a log scale 
ROA  Earnings before interest and taxes to total assets 
Leverage  The debt-to-equity ratio 
R&D  The ratio of R&D investments to total sales 
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Table 2. Table 2. Table 2. Table 2.       Descriptive Statistics Descriptive Statistics Descriptive Statistics Descriptive Statistics a       
    Obs  Mean  SD  Min  Max  VIF  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13 
1  Brand equity  243  14900  14740  2490  65174  8.17  1.00                         
2  Community (%)  243  58.16  22.26  6.32  95.47  6.48  0.25  1.00                       
3  Customer (%)  243  56.28  22.72  4.50  92.46  5.45  0.20  0.62  1.00                     
4  Corporate 
Governance (%)  243  50.39  22.58  4.67  90.48  2.48  0.09  0.67  0.70  1.00                   
5  Employees (%)  243  37.28  19.35  0.00  84.25  5.26  0.11  0.43  0.40  0.57  1.00                 
  6  Suppliers (%)  243  32.06  23.66  0.00  80.00  4.27  0.13  0.45  0.63  0.62  0.42  1.00               
7  Community x 
Customer  243  2671.88  2240.93  0.00  8784.33  10.27  0.22  0.60  0.65  0.52  0.44  0.46  1.00             
8  Community x Corp. 
governance  243  2376.837  1689.684  0.00  8413.04  7.19  0.14  0.71  0.58  0.68  0.47  0.42  0.56  1.00           
9  Community x 
Employees  243  2179.53  1586.45  0.00  7449.20  8.40  0.09  0.79  0.52  0.48  0.79  0.44  0.56  0.67  1.00         
10  Community x 
Suppliers  243  1879.65  1669.966  0.00  7125.00  6.59  0.10  0.70  0.52  0.48  0.79  0.45  0.57  0.67  0.65  1.00       
11  Size  243  16.51  4.43  10.33  26.35  2.56  0.08  0.33  0.28  0.28  0.04  0.02  0.17  0.24  0.07  0.07  1.00     
12  ROA (%)  243  11.32  9.10  -9.95  31.56  1.32  0.10  0.18  0.10  0.04  0.07  0.09  0.09  0.13  0.03  0.02  -0.12  1.00   
13  Leverage  243  2.27  3.91  0.13  4.336  1.13  0.02  -0.18  -0.15  -0.02  -0.10  -0.12  -0.14  -0.18  -0.14  -0.14  0.13  -0.39  1.00 
14  R&D  243  0.33  2.76  0.00  4.22  2.44  0.05  0.28  0.09  0.37  0.13  0.13  0.08  0.32  0.15  0.04  0.65  0.03  -0.16 
a We have shown the figures for Brand equity (BE) in normal scale (million US $) in order to provide a clear picture of the real order of magnitude of brand value of the firms in our sample. 
However, to be consistent with the specifications estimated, we provide VIF as well as correlations using BE on a log scale.  
       
       




Table 3: Determinants of brand equity Table 3: Determinants of brand equity Table 3: Determinants of brand equity Table 3: Determinants of brand equity a 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
VARIABLES  Brand Equity (t) 
Random effects 
Brand Equity (t) 
Random effects 
Brand Equity (t) 
Random effects 
       
Brand Equity (t-1)  0.975***  0.910***  0.822*** 
  (0.037)  (0.020)  (0.034) 
CSR  0.657***     
  (0.201)     
Community    0.725***  0.633*** 
    (0.213)  (0.260) 
Customer    0.544***  0.518*** 
    (0.194)  (0.135) 
Corporate governance    0.510***  0.424*** 
    (0.141)  (0.177) 
Employees    0.491***  0.418*** 
    (0.162)  (0.185) 
Suppliers    0.511***  0.416*** 
    (0.201)  (0.181) 
Community x Customer      0.004*** 
      (0.001) 
Community x Corp. governance      0.002** 
      (0.0008) 
Community x Employees      0.0015** 
      (0.0007) 
Community x Suppliers      0.0019** 
      (0.001) 
Size  0.061***  0.060***  0.058*** 
  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.024) 
ROA  0.037*  0.032*  0.038 
  (0.027)  (0.021)  (0.028) 
Leverage  0.089*  0.076*  0.065 
  (0.051)  (0.050)  (0.083) 
R&D  0.140**  0.095**  0.153* 
  (0.056)  (0.047)  (0.091) 
Intercept  0.499***  0.458***  0.419*** 
  (0.162)  (0.069)  (0.125) 
Observations  243  243  243 
Hausman test  32.28 (0.386)  16.98 (0.596)  11.77 (1.000) 
Weak identification test  60.58 (0.000)  29.05 (0.000)  10.97 (0.052) 
Hansen test (overidentification)  1.49 (0.999)  1.20 (1.000)  1.44 (0.999) 
R2 (%)  93.97%  95.93%  98.97% 
a Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. We use the Stock & Yogo (2005) weak 
identification test, where the null hypothesis is that instruments are weak (non-significant correlation with the 
endogenous variable). The Hansen overidentification test has a null hypothesis such that there is a null correlation 
between the instrument and the error term. Reliable instruments have to reject the null hypothesis in the weak 
identification test and accept it in the Hansen test.  
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APPENDIX: Corporate Sustainability Rating APPENDIX: Corporate Sustainability Rating APPENDIX: Corporate Sustainability Rating APPENDIX: Corporate Sustainability Rating       
       
Stakeholder (j)    Items (i) 
Score 
(%)  Weight  Weighted 
score (%)  Weight  Weighted 
score (%) 
ij S  
ij W  














               
               
Community  1  Local communities programs  100  0.014  1.379  0.154  15.385 
2  Formal policy on local community involvement  100  0.021  2.069  0.231  23.077 
3  Management responsibility for local community 
affairs  100  0.014  1.379  0.154  15.385 
4  Formal volunteer programs  0  0.014  0.000  0.154  0.000 
5  Programs for consultation with local communities  0  0.014  0.000  0.154  0.000 
6  Percentage of donations directed at local communities  20  0.014  0.276  0.154  3.077 
    COMMUNITY SCORE          56.92 
               
               
Customer  1  A formal policy statement noting customer issues  100  0.010  1.034  0.038  3.797 
2  Formal policy on product quality  100  0.052  5.172  0.190  18.987 
3  Formal policy on marketing/advertising practices  100  0.052  5.172  0.190  18.987 
4  Formal policy on product safety  100  0.028  2.759  0.101  10.127 
5  Board responsibility for customer satisfaction  100  0.028  2.759  0.101  10.127 
6  Facilities with quality certification  0  0.052  0.000  0.190  0.000 
7  Marketing practices to satisfy customers  0  0.052  0.000  0.190  0.000 
    CUSTOMERS SCORE          62.03 
               
               
Corporate 
governance 
1  Number of board committees  60  0.010  0.621  0.058  3.462 
2  Managerial stock ownership (%)  20  0.007  0.138  0.038  0.769 
3  The company has corporate governance principles  100  0.062  6.207  0.346  34.615 
4  Directors' term of office  20  0.007  0.138  0.038  0.769 
5  Board performance evaluation  0  0.007  0.000  0.038  0.000 
6  Number of NEDs in the Board  100  0.017  1.724  0.096  9.615 
7  Number of independent NEDs in the Board  40  0.017  0.690  0.096  3.846 
8  Separate position for chairman of board and CEO  100  0.017  1.724  0.096  9.615 
9  "One share, one vote" principle  100  0.017  1.724  0.096  9.615 
10  Absence of anti-takeover devices  0  0.017  0.000  0.096  0.000 
    CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SCORE          72.31 
               
               
Employees  1  Policies/Principles regarding employees  100  0.010  1.034  0.042  4.167 
2  Formal policy statement on health and safety  100  0.024  2.414  0.097  9.722 
3  Formal policy on diversity/employment equity  100  0.024  2.414  0.097  9.722 
4  Formal policy on freedom of association  100  0.024  2.414  0.097  9.722 
5  Formal policy statement on child/forced labor  100  0.010  1.034  0.042  4.167 
6  Formal policy statement on working hours  100  0.024  2.414  0.097  9.722 
7  Formal policy statement on wages  100  0.010  1.034  0.042  4.167 
8  Board responsibility for human resources issues  100  0.017  1.724  0.069  6.944 
9  Specific health and safety targets  0  0.017  0.000  0.069  0.000 
10  Diversity/Equal opportunity programs  0  0.017  0.000  0.069  0.000 
11  Work/Life programs  0  0.017  0.000  0.069  0.000 
12  Training programs  100  0.017  1.724  0.069  6.944 
13  Participative management programs  0  0.017  0.000  0.069  0.000 
14  Cash profit sharing programs  0  0.010  0.000  0.042  0.000 
15  Supervisory Board (NEDs)  100  0.007  0.690  0.028  2.778 
    EMPLOYEES SCORE          68.06 
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Stakeholder (j)    Items (i) 
Score 
(%)  Weight  Weighted 
score (%)  Weight  Weighted 
score (%) 
ij S  
ij W  














               
Suppliers  1  Code of conduct for contractors  100  0.014  1.379  0.058  5.797 
2  Board responsibility for contractors’ human rights  100  0.052  5.172  0.217  21.739 
3  Contractors' awareness programs  100  0.052  5.172  0.217  21.739 
4  Contractors with social certification  0  0.034  0.000  0.145  0.000 
5  Health and safety among contractors  100  0.017  1.724  0.072  7.246 
6  Freedom of association among contractors  100  0.017  1.724  0.072  7.246 
7  Child/Forced labor among contractors  0  0.017  0.000  0.072  0.000 
8  Discrimination among contractors  100  0.017  1.724  0.072  7.246 
9  Employment conditions among contractors  20  0.017  0.345  0.072  1.449 
    SUPPLIERS SCORE          72.46 
               
                ij ij ij CSR S W = × ∑                         69.10 69.10 69.10 69.10                       
                                                               
Sustainalytics provides a wide range of research and consultancy services to the largest asset managers, insurance companies, 
pension funds, banks, and social investment institutions in the world.  One of these services is the Sustainalytics Global Profile 
(SGP).  SGP  provides  a  rating  that  enables  users  to  integrate  firms’  detailed  profiles  in  a  unique  rating  that  contains  199 
information items. These information items are translated into a more comprehensive format – a rating – by implementing 
Likert-type scales and then they are grouped into eight research sections.  The first provides a description of ethical/unethical 
corporate activities, such as political donations, corruption and bribery, and the existence of business ethics programs addressing 
these issues. The last section measures the degree  of involvement in controversial business activities like gambling, alcohol, 
pornography, animal testing, and tobacco. The realization of one of these controversial activities is motive of exclusion of the 
SGP  sustainability  index.  The  remaining  six  sections  cover  different  issues  of  the  six  stakeholders  analyzed  (community; 
customers;  employees;  corporate  governance;  suppliers  and  environment).  In  particular,  for  each  stakeholder,  the  database 
addresses the level of firm’s involvement in four different areas: the level of a firm’s transparency/disclosure; the existence of 
corporate policies and principles for the stakeholder; the importance management procedures; and the level of controversies in the 
relation with this stakeholder. In each of these areas, there are different information items that give a score in a Likert-type scale. 
Also, each information item has a weight according to a methodology developed by SGP. The final score provided by SGP is the 
sum  of  each  of  the  scores  of  all  the  items  averaged  by  its  corresponding  weight.  Also,  the  database  gives  scores  for  each 
stakeholder.  These  scores  are  computed  through  the  weighted  average  of  the  corresponding  information  items  to  a  given 
stakeholder normalized by the sum of the weights of the items for the corresponding stakeholder. For clarification purposes, 
below we describe in detail the information items that we consider in the paper for a particular, real company (Nestle). In 
particular, we focus on those items related to policies and principles as well as managerial procedures of the five stakeholders that 
are considered in the study (community; customers; corporate governance; employees; suppliers). 
 
 
  
 